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1Abstract
This paper oﬀers a new explanation for the empirically observed
inter-industry wage variation. We represent an industry by a small
open economy with inter-ﬁrm labor mobility. Each industry is charac-
terized by a degree of learning-by-doing, learning-by-hiring, inter-ﬁrm
mobility costs and technological level. In this economy we analyze
how these features aﬀect the wage level of the industry. The vari-
ety of knowledge within an industry and its capital intensity is also
analyzed. Results show that industries with high learning-by-hiring
and low mobility costs generally pay higher wages. More learning-
by-doing and higher technological level in an industry is also giving
higher wages. Results provide new hypotheses to be tested and are
consistent with the ﬁnding that more capital intensive industries pay
higher wages.
21 Introduction
Inter-industry wage diﬀerences have been widely documented. They are
found to be large and persistent across time and countries (Dickens and
Katz, 1987; Krueger and Summers, 1987; Murphy and Topel, 1990). Al-
though there are some theories on the existence of such wage variation, empir-
ical testing does not get a general consensus on which theory prevails. More-
over, there is always left some inter-industry wage variation unexplained. The
result most widely accepted for its robustness is that more capital-intensive
industries as well as more proﬁtable ones tend to pay higher wages for the
same work and type of worker. There is a need for new theories to explain
such regularities and provide new hypotheses to be tested.
In this paper we present a theoretical explanation for these inter-industry
diﬀerences. In contrast to some of the hypotheses oﬀered so far, such as the
eﬃciency wage theory, we rely on competitive markets where workers are
paid their marginal productivity.
We characterize an industry using four main elements: learning-by-doing,
learning-by-hiring, inter-ﬁrm mobility costs and technological level. We ar-
gue that all of these factors matter in determining the wage level of an in-
dustry.
We assume labor market segmentation in the sense that each industry has
a ﬁx supply of labor. You may think of individuals having strong tastes on
which industry to work, or industries requiring speciﬁc worker characteristics
(Dickens and Lang, 1988).
Moreover, we assume that mobility of workers within an industry goes to-
gether with knowledge diﬀusion. That is workers have embodied knowl-
edge and when they move between ﬁrms their knowledge travels with them.
Evidence on the transfer of knowledge through labor mobility (learning-by-
hiring) refers especially to the mobility of technical or R&D personnel in
high-tech or R&D intensive industries (Saxenian, 1994; Zucker, Darby and
Brewer, 1998; Almeida and Kogut, 1999). In our model only experienced
workers can move between ﬁrms. We also assume that heterogeneity of
knowledge brings extra productivity to the ﬁrm. There is evidence that
innovation comes easier when there is exchange of knowledge among sci-
entists, technicians or researchers in general (Peri, 2005; Leonard and Sen-
siper, 1998; Ettlie, 1980; Sakakibara, 1997). Diﬀerent points of view, diﬀerent
expertise together may innovate faster than a homogeneous group of workers.
Furthermore, the latter literature puts especial emphasis on tacit knowledge,
which requires face-to-face contact among individuals. We introduce this
observation in our model by assuming that workers can exchange knowledge
only within the ﬁrm.
3The model gives six main predictions about the inter-industry wage dispari-
ties. Ceteris paribus, an industry pays higher wages than the rest when:
• The learning-by-hiring component is more important in this industry.
• Costs for the mobility of workers across ﬁrms are lower.
• When the industry productivity depends on a wider variety of knowl-
edge.
• When there is large complementarity between diﬀerent types of expe-
rienced workers (they are further from perfect substitutes).
• The industry oﬀers more learning-by-doing opportunities to its workers.
• The industry is technologically advanced.
Other papers have addressed the inter-industry wage diﬀerential issue. Those
within a competitive framework sustain that workers sort by ability across
industries (Kremer, 1993) or that working conditions diﬀer across industries
(compensating diﬀerences theory). These diﬀerences in workers’ ability or
working conditions would explain the existence of inter-industry wage varia-
tion.
Another work within the competitive framework is that of Zabojnik and
Bernhardt (2001). They provide a model where workers’ investment in hu-
man capital is determined by ﬁrm and industry characteristics. The mech-
anism is as follows. Workers invest in costly human capital in order to get
promoted. The wages of winners and losers are not ﬁxed by the ﬁrm, but
competitively. All ﬁrms in the industry may bid for the promoted workers.
They get as a result that the promotion premium diﬀers across ﬁrms and
industries.
In contrast to these theories, eﬃciency wage models give reasons why ﬁrms
in a particular industry may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to pay workers above their
competitive level. High payment in order to induce high eﬀort when moni-
toring costs are substantial can be one example (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
Several papers have analyzed empirically these hypotheses. However, they
reach contradictory results. For instance, while Murphy and Topel (1987)
ﬁnd evidence on the sorting theory, Krueger and Summers (1988) present
evidence against it. Furthermore, most of the existing literature agrees that
a substantial part of wage variation is left unexplained.
The main contribution of this paper is to oﬀer a new explanation for the
observed inter-industry wage diﬀerences. New industry characteristics are
4introduced that had not been considered in this literature, namely learning-
by-hiring, mobility costs, learning-by-doing, variety of knowledge and com-
plementarity of experienced workers. Additionally, we introduce a new mod-
eling of labor mobility in a competitive framework which may turn out useful
for other purposes than the only ones presented in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model
of labor mobility with knowledge diﬀusion. Section 3 describes the symmet-
ric equilibrium, which is used in section 4 for a comparative static analysis.
In section 5 we discuss and compare our results with the existing empirical
evidence on inter-industry wage disparities, concluding the paper.
2 The model
We deﬁne an industry as a small open economy. Agents can borrow or lend
money at an exogenous interest rate rt. There are ﬁrms and workers in the
industry. Let us denote by Ft the number of ﬁrms in the industry each period.
They are identical in everything except that each ﬁrm has a diﬀerent type
of knowledge. As noted in the previous section, we assume segmented labor
markets in the sense that there is a ﬁx supply of labor per industry. Workers
live for two periods and each generation has a measure Nt of individuals
ready to work in a particular industry.
When individuals are young they work in a ﬁrm as unexperienced workers
(Lt). By working in the ﬁrm they learn the speciﬁc knowledge of the ﬁrm
without any cost (learning-by-doing), so that, at the beginning of next period,
there is a positive amount of senior workers with the knowledge developed
in each ﬁrm. We call them experienced workers.
In each period ﬁrms may hire their own experienced workers and external
experienced workers. Denote by λ
j
it the amount of experienced workers from
ﬁrm j that are hired by ﬁrm i in period t, j 6= i. As already stated above, they
have embodied knowledge type j. We call them poached workers. Similarly,
let ηit be the amount of own experienced workers hired by the same ﬁrm i at
period t, which have knowledge type i. They are called retained workers.
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5where Ajt is a measure of the knowledge of the type-j worker and p is a
parameter which lies between 0 and 1 and measures the ability of learning-
by-hiring of the ﬁrm.
We assume that Ait > Bt−1, which means that workers learn while working
in the ﬁrm. We refer to it as learning-by-doing.
In contrast, learning-by-hiring refers to the ability of a ﬁrm to acquire ex-
ternal knowledge through hiring external workers (poaching). We consider
it may be limited by three main factors: the intrinsic characteristics of the
knowledge in question (whether it is ﬁrm or industry-speciﬁc); the degree of
capacity of ﬁrms to acquire such external knowledge (concept of absorptive
capability of ﬁrms developed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990)), and ﬁnally,
the type of environment where ﬁrms develop their tasks (e.g. institutions,
local legal system which may enforce or not clauses not-to-compete, strongly
defend trade secrets, etc.).1 When one or several of these factors diminish the
potential of learning-by-hiring, the parameter p will be low, and vice versa.
Notice that the asymmetry in the CES function appears because we assume
that knowledge from own workers (Ait) is fully accessible by the ﬁrm while
knowledge from poached workers may be less accessible, i.e. p ∈ [0,1].
Knowledge in our model has two dimensions: variety and level of knowledge.
The subindex i in Ait indicates the type of knowledge (in which ﬁrm the
worker learnt his knowledge), while the level of knowledge is indicated by
the particular value of A. In general the level of knowledge may be diﬀerent
across ﬁrms. Variety of knowledge is ensured by assuming that each ﬁrm has
a diﬀerent type of knowledge.
With such speciﬁcations, we obtain a functional form for output similar to
the one derived in Romer (1990), but instead of diﬀerent types of capital
goods, here we have diﬀerent types of human capital. In the conventional
speciﬁcation, total human capital is implicitly deﬁned as being proportional
to the sum of all the types of human capital, assuming perfect substitutability
among them. We allow for some level of complementarity among diﬀerent
types of human capital. In our case the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerent types of experienced workers is 1
1−σ. We assume that they are im-
1There is empirical evidence that shows how important diﬀerences in legal systems
may be in determining the rate of labor mobility of a region when learning-by-hiring is
relevant. Hyde (1998), Gilson (1999) and Valetta (2002) argue that Silicon Valley was
originated in California precisely because there clauses not-to-compete have weak enforce-
ability. Almeida and Kogut (1999) point out at the importance of ”social institutions
that support a viable ﬂow of ideas within the spatial conﬁnes of regional economies” for
creating the externalities that foster innovation (p.916).














We assume decreasing returns to all inputs (0 < α < 1,0 < β < 1 and
α + β < 1). The parameter Bt converts raw quantities of unexperienced
labor into eﬃciency units. We assume it is the same for all ﬁrms. It is like
to say that all young workers have the same level of education before they
enter the industry.
Notice that even though the production function has constant returns to
scale, the number of ﬁrms matters because it determines the variety of knowl-
edge in the economy. Moreover, we assume that without workers there is no
access to knowledge.
Notice also that the CES functional form of the human capital measure en-
sures that variety of knowledge within the ﬁrm improves productivity. The
interpretation is that exchange of knowledge matters for productivity. More-
over, we allow for the interaction of knowledge to happen only when two
workers work in the same ﬁrm, which is coherent with the idea that tacit
knowledge is important for innovation and needs face-to-face contact to be
transmitted.
We assume perfect competition in the product market to be able to isolate
the exchange of knowledge eﬀect on the labor market. To simplify we assume
that all ﬁrms can sell all the product at a given price, which we normalize to
1.
At the beginning of each period there is a measure Li,t−1 of experienced work-
ers for each type of knowledge in the industry (i = 1,...F). Moreover, there
is a positive cost for workers to move from one ﬁrm to the other, which we
denote by m. It may include the real cost of changing place of residence as
well as the subjective cost associated to it.
We consider the case of perfect competition in the labor market, so that ﬁrms
take wages as given. Let wi
t be the wage for young workers and ωit the wage
of type i experienced workers paid by ﬁrm i in period t. Notice that the wage
of experienced workers ωit has to be greater than wi
t to induce experienced
workers to work. Otherwise they would prefer to work as unexperienced ones.
Let ωi
jt be the wage paid by a ﬁrm j to the experienced workers type i. For
this type of workers to move to ﬁrm j, they must be paid at least as much as
in ﬁrm i plus mobility costs, that is, ωi
jt ≥ ωit+m. Since the labor market
is perfectly competitive, the former condition holds with equality in equilib-
rium and an experienced worker is indiﬀerent between moving or staying. In
such a case we assume that workers are willing to change ﬁrm.
Each ﬁrm i decides the amount ηit of own experienced workers to retain, the
7amount λ
j
it of experienced workers to poach from each ﬁrm j (j 6= i), the
amount of young workers to hire Lit and the amount of physical capital Kit
to rent. We assume full depreciation of physical capital.
The problem of the ﬁrm is to maximize the discounted sum of future proﬁts.
In our especiﬁcation each period is independent from each other. In partic-
ular we assume that the technological parameters Ait and Bt are exogenous
and do not depend on ﬁrm decisions. In such a case the ﬁrm’s problem can
be expressed as a static one.
Given the competitive wages wi
t, ωjt and ω
j
it such that ω
j
it ≥ ωjt + m and
wi























































σ−1 = ωjt+m ∀j 6= i,
(4)






























1−α−β = Rt. (6)
Equation (3) equalizes marginal productivity of retained workers in ﬁrm i to
their wage.
Equation (4) does the same for workers poached from ﬁrm j by ﬁrm i. Notice
that we already introduce the equilibrium result on wages, ω
j
it = ωjt + m.
Similarly, equation (5) is the marginal productivity of young workers equal
to their wage.
Finally, equation (6) sets marginal productivity of physical capital to the
marginal cost, which is the rental payment Rt. In equilibrium it must hap-
pen that the rental rate equals the interest rate plus the depreciation rate
(Rt = rt + 1) in order to ensure no arbitrage possibilities in the economy.
Notice that since marginal productivity of poached workers at λ
j
it = 0 is
inﬁnity for all i,j (see equation 4) and there is no cost of adapting variety
of knowledge, all ﬁrms will poach workers from all the other ﬁrms in the in-
dustry to access the whole range of knowledge.2 Moreover, ﬁrms will always
2We could limit the number of ﬁrms from which to poach workers by introducing a cost
of adaptation of external knowledge which increases with the variety of knowledge. This
would complicate the analysis without giving any new insights into the model.
8want to retain some of their own workers because the marginal productivity
of retained workers when the industry retains zero workers is inﬁnite (from
equation 3).3
Since there is a perfect capital market, individuals care about maximizing
their life-time income, which depends on which ﬁrm they start working. Then
they can save or borrow to allocate inter-temporally their consumption ac-
cording to their preferences. In equilibrium it must happen that all workers







∀i 6= j. (7)
Notice that although an experienced worker type i poached by ﬁrm j earns
ωi
jt = ωit + m, he incurs a cost m by moving, so the total available income
when he is experienced reduces to ωit. Thus, equation (7) refers as much to
stayers as to movers.
Next we present the clearing market conditions for the labor market. Equa-









jt + ηit = Li,t−1 ∀i = 1,...F, (9)
In the left-hand side of equations (8) and (9) there is the total demand
for young workers and experienced workers type i, respectively. The right-
hand side shows the total supply of these types of workers. These equations
together with equation (7) determine wit and ωit.
3 The symmetric equilibrium
We look at the symmetric equilibrium. This is when all levels of knowledge
are the same across ﬁrms, although the type of knowledge keeps being dif-
ferent for each ﬁrm. In such a case Ait = At ∀i. Moreover, all ﬁrms hire the
3These conditions are suﬃcient but not necessary to obtain positive labor mobility
in equilibrium. The necessary condition for positive labor mobility is that the marginal
productivity of the ﬁrst worker type i willing to move is lower in her ﬁrm of origin than in
any other ﬁrm. Similarly, the condition for having some retained workers in equilibrium
is that the marginal productivity of the ﬁrst retained worker is higher than the marginal
productivity of this type of worker in any other ﬁrm when all workers of his type are
working for that ﬁrm.
9same amount of young workers each period. This implies that there is the
same amount of experienced workers of each type at the beginning of each
period (Li,t = Nt
Ft∀i). There is no population growth neither technological
growth (Nt, Ft, Bt and At are constant overtime). Notice that given all these
conditions there is no need for time subscripts anymore.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a constant exogenous interest rate r, the symmetric
equilibrium is characterized by the vector of variables η,λ,L,K and the prices
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(F − 1)λ + η = L. (15)
Equations (10) to (13) come from the ﬁrm’s problem and equations (14) and
(15) are the labor market clearing conditions. There is missing equation
(7) from the previous section, which becomes an identity in a symmetric
equilibrium.













This allows us to distinguish between the eﬀect of learning-by-doing and the
technological level. Let us denote (A
B)α the learning-by-doing component
of the total factor productivity (TFP) and B1−β the technological level
of the industry. Let us do two observations on this decomposition. When
A
B > 1 there is learning-by-doing in the industry. When A and B grow in the
same proportion, then the learning-by-doing component is not aﬀected and
the technological level increases.
In the next section we calibrate this symmetric equilibrium and compute a
comparative static analysis to identify how each parameter aﬀects wages in
this economy.
104 The comparative static analysis
We want to explain inter-industry diﬀerences in wage levels. Using the
previous model we want to analyze how industries with diﬀerent levels of
learning-by-hiring capabilities, diﬀerent mobility costs, diﬀerent learning-by-
doing possibilities and diﬀerent initial productivity of workers have diﬀerent
wage levels. In order to do so, we simulate the model and pursue a compar-
ative static analysis on the symmetric equilibrium.
For the simulation we take standard values of the basic parameters. We
assume each period has 25 years. α takes the value 0.4 and β takes 0.3.
For σ there is no previous literature, so we take an arbitrary value for the
baseline parametrization, 0.5. This sigma-value corresponds to an elasticity
of substitution among diﬀerent types of experienced workers of 2%.
We give arbitrary numbers to the rest of the parameters (A = 100,B =
1,N = 100,F = 10) in order to have interior solutions. We assume a 5%
annual interest rate, which corresponds to a 2.4% interest rate in 25 years.
Results are robust to changes in the parametrization baseline.
Figures 1 to 6 show graphically the relationships between the parameters of
the model and its main variables.
Recall that parameter p represents the learning-by-hiring ability of the ﬁrm,
m is a measure of the inter-ﬁrm mobility costs and F corresponds to the
number of ﬁrms as well as to the variety of knowledge in the industry. The
ratio 1
1−σ is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent types of experi-
enced workers.
Variations in the parameter A tell us about diﬀerences in learning-by-doing
(see equation 16), while variations in B maintaining A
B constant refers to
changes in the technological level of the industry.
Figure 1 describes how learning-by-hiring aﬀects the industry variables.
As expected, the learning-by-hiring potential (p) of an industry aﬀects posi-
tively the labor mobility rate of this industry as well as the ﬁrm production
net of mobility costs, the capital-labor ratio and the wages for all type of
workers.
Intuitively, a higher learning-by-hiring ability directly aﬀects the production
level. It also increases the marginal productivity of all types of labor. This
translates in higher demand for all types of workers and since supply is inelas-
tic, wages must increase in equilibrium. Marginal productivity of poached
workers increases relatively more than that of retained workers (p enters twice
in the marginal productivity of poached workers), which explains why labor
mobility increases with higher learning-by-hiring. Finally, the marginal pro-
ductivity of physical capital increases, and since the total amount of labor
per ﬁrm remains ﬁx, the capital-labor ratio of ﬁrms also increases.
11Figure 2 reveals how a change in mobility costs aﬀects the variables of the
model. An increase in the mobility costs means that the economy will have
to direct more resources to cover them, which provokes a decrease in the ﬁrm
production net of these costs. They also increase the cost of poaching work-
ers, so ﬁrms will substitute them for retained workers that are now relatively
cheaper.
The mobility of labor in equilibrium will be reduced. More retained workers
implies that their marginal productivity is lower, so the wage for experienced
workers decreases. Since each ﬁrm hires less external workers, their comple-
mentarity beneﬁts are lower and the marginal productivity of physical capital
and young workers are lower too. Then, the capital-labor ratio and the wage
for young workers also diminish. Notice however, that the wage for young
workers is much less aﬀected than the wage for experienced workers.
In our model the parameter F refers at the same time to the number of ﬁrms
and the variety of knowledge in the economy. Actually even if we have
a constant returns to scale technology, the number of ﬁrms matters because
it also determines the variety of knowledge. Thus, we want to interpret this
parameter with the latter meaning.
Figure 3 shows the results when we increase F and N proportionally, so that
each ﬁrm has always the same size. This allows us to isolate the variety of
knowledge eﬀect from the size eﬀect.
The greater the variety of knowledge, the greater the ﬁrm net production.
Moreover, since each ﬁrm is poaching workers from all the other ﬁrms in
the market, the total demand for each type of experienced workers increases.
Thus the total experienced worker’s wage increases unambiguously. This will
reduce the amount of retained workers in equilibrium, meaning that the ﬁrm
labor mobility must increase.
Even if each ﬁrm is now poaching less experienced workers from each other,
there are more ﬁrms in the industry, so the total amount of labor mobility
per ﬁrm increases. The marginal productivity of physical capital and that
of young workers increase. Then, capital-labor ratio and wages for young
workers increase too.
We obtain similar results when keeping N constant. The only diﬀerence is
then that two eﬀects are at work, the increase in variety of knowledge and a
decrease in the number of workers per ﬁrm as F increases. In general then
results show that ﬁrm net production decreases except when the complemen-
tarities among experienced workers are big enough (σ small) to compensate
for the decrease in the amount of workers per ﬁrm. In any case aggregate
net production increases unambiguously.
An increase in the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent types of
experienced workers ( 1
1−σ) makes it less important for productivity to have
12diﬀerent types of these workers. There are less learning opportunities of
mixing diﬀerent types of workers, which translates in less production, as can
be seen in ﬁgure 4. This aﬀects also to the demand of such workers that
diminishes as well as their wages. Marginal productivity of young workers
decreases and their wage does so too. The capital-labor ratio decreases.
Figure 5 represents the changes in the variables when we increase A. Follow-
ing the decomposition of total ﬁrm productivity in equation (16) we interpret
an increase in A as a larger learning-by-doing oﬀered to the workers in this
industry. Increasing A keeping B constant aﬀects the learning-by-doing com-
ponent of the TFP only.
Higher learning-by-doing implies that experienced workers have larger knowl-
edge, so they are more productive. Production increases as well as the wages
of experienced workers. It also aﬀects the productivity of young workers,
who earn more when there is more learning-by-doing. The labor mobility
rate and the capital-labor ratio increase too.
Finally, the eﬀects of an increase in the level of knowledge of young workers
(B) is reported in ﬁgure 6. Actually, we are increasing here both productivity
parameters A and B so that the learning-by-doing component of TFP (A
B)
keeps unaﬀected and the technological level (B) grows.
These changes aﬀect positively all the variables of analysis. It increases
the marginal productivity of all types of labor, thus their wage level does
the same. Production is larger, there is more mobility of workers and the
capital-labor ratio increases.
In the next section we discuss our results and relate them to the empirical
evidence on inter-industry wage diﬀerences.
5 Concluding discussion
The main stylized facts about inter-industry wage variation can be summa-
rized as follows (Krueger and Summers, 1987; Murphy and Topel, 1987; Dick-
ens and Katz, 1987):
1. There exist large and persistent wage diﬀerences across industries.
2. Inter-industry wage diﬀerences are similar across developed countries.
3. More capital-intensive industries tend to pay higher wages.
4. Industries that pay high to some type of workers tend to pay high to
all type of workers.
5. Industries with higher proﬁts tend to pay higher to their workers.
136. Bigger ﬁrms tend to pay higher than smaller ones.
The two main theories that want to explain this phenomenon are the eﬃ-
ciency wage theory and the sorting of workers.
The main idea behind the eﬃciency wage theory is that shirking problems are
more severe in some industries. Where these problems are more severe and
monitoring more costly, industries may pay higher-than-competitive wages
in order to motivate the worker to exert the maximum eﬀort. This non-
competitive theory would explain some of the variation in wages across in-
dustries.
The second theory says that workers sort into diﬀerent industries according
to some unobservable characteristics. The industries that pay higher wages
are those that attract high-productivity workers.
The existing empirical testing of these two hypotheses does not reach a con-
sensus and the puzzle remains unresolved.
In this paper we argue that several characteristics of the industries could be
related to this wage diﬀerential. In particular we argue that industries diﬀer
in six concepts:
1. Their learning-by-hiring ability (acquiring external knowledge through
hiring new workers), which depends on the type of knowledge in the
industry (whether it is ﬁrm-speciﬁc or industry-speciﬁc), on the ab-
sorptive capacity of ﬁrms and on the institutional environment where
the industry develops.
2. Their inter-ﬁrm mobility costs. They may depend on the spatial dis-
tribution of the industry as well as on institutional variables, such as
the easiness to ﬁnd information about job oﬀers within the industry.
3. Their variety of knowledge. The importance of diﬀerent types of knowl-
edge for ﬁrm productivity.
4. The elasticity of substitution of diﬀerent types of experienced workers.
5. The learning-by-doing oﬀered to their workers. This may create non-
observable heterogeneous workers across industries.
6. The technological level of the industry.
If these six industry characteristics are common across countries and do not
change overtime, they can account for the stability found in the wage struc-
ture.
Our results show that industries with higher learning-by-hiring and larger
14variety of knowledge pay higher wages to both unexperienced and experi-
enced workers.
Similarly, when an industry is spatially concentrated or mobility costs are
low, wages are larger.
The more complementarities among diﬀerent type of experienced workers,
the better paid are all the workers in the industry.
Finally, the more learning-by-doing in the industry and the more advanced
technologically it is, the better it pays to its workers.
Moreover we ﬁnd that industries which pay higher wages are also those that
have a higher capital-labor ratio, in agreement with the empirical ﬁndings.
Although we have perfect competition in the product market, we argue that
if industries with a high-proﬁt rate are those with a high-learning compo-
nent and high technological level, then our results would be consistent with
the observation that they tend to pay high wages. With the existence of
market power ﬁrms are more concerned to keep their knowledge private and
pay higher wages to their workers in order to deter their moving to competi-
tors. This result has been developed in Combes and Duranton (2006) among
others. Thus, if industries with high concentration levels are those where
learning-by-doing is more important, both results, market competition and
learning-by-doing, reinforce each other and wages should be deﬁnitely larger
there than in other industries.
Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) oﬀer an alternative theory based on industry
heterogeneity. They introduce investment in human capital and corporate
tournaments. Their model implies that worker in bigger ﬁrms and in more
technology intensive and proﬁtable industries acquire more human capital
and receive higher wages and beneﬁts. Although with a very diﬀerent ap-
proach, we ﬁnd similar results, namely that more learning-by-doing as well
as more advanced technological industries pay better their workers.
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